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Big Law, Public Defender-Style:
Aggregating Resources to Ensure
Uniform Quality of Representation
Eve Hanan*
Abstract
Stories abound of public defenders who, overwhelmed with
high caseloads, allow defendants to languish in pre-trial detention
and guilty pleas to be entered without examining the merits of the
case. Most defendants cannot afford to hire an attorney, and, thus,
have no choice other than to accept the public counsel appointed by
the court. In this Essay, I consider whether Professor Benjamin
Edwards’ central argument in The Professional Prospectus: A Call
for Effective Professional Disclosure1—that attorneys should
provide potential clients with a prospectus disclosing their
performance history—applies to criminal defense. I reject the
proposition that most people charged with crimes would have better
representation if they could choose their attorneys and, to that end,
had adequate information about their attorney’s past performance.
I conclude, instead, that the problem of inadequate criminal defense
representation can be better remedied by improving the
infrastructure for public defense.
Others have argued that large, state-wide public defender
offices provide better representation than smaller public defender
offices or systems in which private attorneys accept public
appointments from the court because large offices can aggregate
resources. This essay adds to the discussion of the benefits of large
public defender offices in two ways. First, it argues that statewide
public defender offices can be evaluated for effectiveness, allowing
potential clients and the general public to assess the quality of
* Associate Professor, University of Nevada Las Vegas, Boyd School of
Law, J.D. University of Michigan Law School.
1. Benjamin P. Edwards, The Professional Prospectus: A Call for Effective
Professional Disclosure, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1457 (2017).
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representation they provide. Adequate information about the
effectiveness of the large public defender offices can overcome a
common mistake that potential clients make regarding criminal
defense—that a private attorney is always more effective than a
public defender.
Second, statewide public defender offices can use performance
data and institutional processes to implement uniform structural
and attitudinal changes that insure consistently excellent
representation from all attorneys working in the office. The question
of access to information about attorney performance is still relevant
but should be reframed. It is not a question of how individual
clients can evaluate individual attorneys, but of how the public
sphere can use the information available to institutionalize
excellence in public defense.
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I. Introduction
A firefighter on leave with a back injury begins taking
prescribed opioids. He becomes addicted and loses his job. Several
months later, he is arrested and charged with possession of heroin
with intent to distribute. He could receive one of the following
types of legal representation:
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1. An assistant public defender who works on salary for
the public defender agency in the county or state where
he is charged; or
2. A panel attorney, otherwise in private practice, who
receives a fee from the court for representing indigent
people charged with crimes; or
3. A private attorney, if and only if, the firefighter or
someone close to him can raise the money. This attorney
must carry a high caseload because she charges a low
hourly rate or a low flat-fee.

The firefighter’s choice is limited. If he does not have enough
money to hire a private attorney, he will either get the assistant
public defender or the panel attorney, depending on the system in
place in the jurisdiction where he is prosecuted. If he is indigent
but has access to money through family or friends, he may be able
to retain a private attorney, but perhaps not the attorney he would
choose if he had more money.
Is the problem his lack of choice, or is the problem poverty and
poorly funded public defense? If the problem is a lack of choice, the
quality of information available to the firefighter is essential. He
needs to know which attorneys are competent to defend against
drug charges. On the other hand, even a defendant with perfect
knowledge of the legal market cannot use that information to
choose an attorney if he lacks the financial resources to do so.
In this Essay, I consider whether Professor Edwards’ central
argument in The Professional Prospectus: A Call for Effective
Professional Disclosure2—that attorneys should provide potential
clients with a prospectus disclosing their performance history—
applies to criminal defense, an area of legal representation in
which 80% of defendants are sufficiently impoverished to qualify
for court-appointed counsel.3 Although I agree with Professor
Edwards that information deficits cause some potential clients to
choose counsel unwisely, the solution is not to give them more
information or even more choice. The root problem in criminal
defense stems from chronic underfunding. Because of this, a public
2. Benjamin P. Edwards, The Professional Prospectus: A Call for Effective
Professional Disclosure, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1457 (2017).
3. Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration of Systemic
Problem?, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 739 (2006).
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system that relies on large public defender offices pooling
resources will ultimately provide better representation than a
market-based system in which defendants choose attorneys based
on enhanced information about their performance.
Since the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright,4 states have
assembled a patchwork of public defense systems.5 Two models are
common: In the first, the county or state establishes a public
defender office that hires attorneys to work full-time as assistant
public defenders. In the second, private attorneys, often referred to
as “panel attorneys,” accept appointment to criminal cases for an
hourly or per-case fee. Some jurisdictions have a hybrid model that
consists of both a public defender and a bar of panel attorneys. In
2007, the Census of Public Defender Offices noted that there are
over 1,000 state and county public defender offices, including
capital units and offices handling conflicts.6 Twenty-two states
have public defender offices either at the county or state level or
have a county-state hybrid.7
In every respect, states and the federal government have
failed to provide adequate resources to ensure that the legal right
to counsel is fulfilled in practice.8 Public defender offices and panel
attorneys lack the resources to maintain low caseloads, to train
their new attorneys, and to hire the investigators, social workers,
and experts. The right to counsel has ensured only a warm body
standing in the courtroom. It has not ensured zealous
representation in any meaningful sense.9
4.
5.

372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
SUZANNE M. STRONG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE-ADMINISTERED
INDIGENT
DEFENSE
SYSTEMS,
2013
(2016),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/saids13.pdf.
6. Data Collection: Census of Public Defender Offices (CPDO), BUREAU JUST.
STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=401 (last visited Mar. 9,
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. Id.
8. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal
Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045 (2006) (surveying and
discussing numerous reports, which concluded that defense funding is
“drastically underfinanced”).
9. Defendants have a right to the effective assistance of counsel as defined
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). Practitioners and legal
scholars have criticized the Strickland standard as providing an inadequate
means to address indefensibly bad representation of indigent defendants. See
generally, e.g., William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal
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To be sure, there are many zealous, hardworking, and effective
defense attorneys in every system of public defense, often laboring
without the benefit of resources that they merit. There are also
excellent public defender offices, which have the resources to keep
caseloads low so that their attorneys can mount an effective
defense for their clients.10 I had the honor of working for some of
the best—the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia,
the Committee for Public Counsel Services in Boston, and, most
recently, as a strategic litigation planner for the Maryland Office
of the Public Defender. But the overall impression of public
defenders, and one that is confirmed in post-conviction litigation
where their mistakes are documented, is that many attorneys
providing public defense are too overworked, underpaid, and
psychologically defeated to competently represent their clients.
Much has been said, written, and debated about the problem
of bad representation for poor defendants. Some consider it a
problem of funding, or of funding combined with a public defender
culture of complacency.11 Others frame the problem as a failure to
create incentives, through market-based competition, to motivate
public defenders to compete for clients.12
In this Essay, I first discuss how information deficits may
harm criminal defendants in their limited choice of counsel, using
the case of our hypothetical firefighter described above. I examine
what information is lacking and whether it is feasible to provide
the defendant with the information he would need to choose wisely.
After concluding that it would be exceedingly difficult to arm this
defendant with the information he would need to choose a private
and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM & MARY BILL RTS J. 91
(1995).
10. PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD 212 (2017). Professor Butler notes that
Washington D.C., the Bronx, Harlem, San Francisco, Miami, Oakland,
Philadelphia, West Palm Beach, Seattle, New Hampshire, and Colorado have
well-regarding public defender offices. This list is not, in my experience,
exhaustive. From my professional experience, I would include the Maryland
Office of the Public Defender and the Clark County Public Defender in Nevada. I
am sure there are more.
11. See, e.g., Eve Brenske Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in
Indigent Defense, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1806–12 (2018) (discussing the
relationship between under-funding and office culture in public defender offices).
12. See generally, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Client Choice for Indigent
Criminal Defendants: Theory and Implementation, 12 OHIO J. CRIM. LAW 505
(2015) (arguing that free enterprise incentives could improve indigent defense).
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attorney, I turn to a discussion of the alternative—investing
resources to build and improve state-wide public defender offices
that ensure attorney quality through shared resources and
oversight.
While discussing attorney performance, it is important to keep
in mind that good lawyers are not the panacea for harsh and unjust
criminal and immigration laws. While attorneys can sometimes tilt
the scales into equipoise against the well-resourced state and its
powers of prosecution, many criminal defendants do not stand a
chance of winning, even with the assistance of an excellent
attorney. If we want less harsh outcomes in their cases, we need to
change the laws and hold prosecuting agencies accountable for
their charging decisions.
I. Defendants Who Have a Choice
A. To Hire or Not to Hire
Many people who may qualify for a public defender may,
through sometimes heroic efforts, rally the money to hire a private
attorney. Consider our hypothetical client, the firefighter
described above. He is indigent, because he is unemployed and has
no assets, but some members of his extended family are middle
class. Imagine he was charged in a jurisdiction where indigent
defendants are represented by a state-wide public defender office.
The office has investigators and social workers on staff and
provides attorneys with regular training, oversight, and
mentorship. Within forty-eight hours of appointment, the assistant
public defender assigned to his case files a motion to have the judge
lower his bail amount, sends an investigator out to interview
witnesses, and asks her staff social worker to develop a treatment
plan that will be included in her proposed plea deal.
When the firefighter’s extended family finds out about the
case, they mortgage their home to hire a private attorney who
assures the family that she can get a better deal than the public
defender. The private attorney does not visit the defendant in jail
after the retainer agreement is filed. She does not file a bail appeal
or return the family’s phone calls. At the next court date, the
private attorney tells the defendant that he should plead guilty to
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whatever the prosecutor offers because he had enough heroin in
his possession to support a conviction for distribution. The
defendant asks about a social worker evaluation for treatment, but
the attorney tells him that retaining a social worker is expensive,
and there is no time.
What happened? As a public defender practicing in Boston, I
witnessed this predicament. In many ways, it reflected the
information deficit that Professor Edwards describes. It also
reflected misinformation. The public view is that public defenders
are the equivalent of having no attorney at all.13 This reputation
stems from the reality of many public defender offices, where
chronic underfunding prevents good lawyering and destroys
morale.14 But it did not apply to the public defender office
described, which was providing our firefighter with competent
representation.
Here are four common errors that reflect information
asymmetry between the legal professionals and potential clients
facing criminal charges:
1. Hiring a private attorney in a county or state that has
a great public defender
2. Hiring a private attorney without knowing that you will
be charged out of pocket for expenses such as
investigators and experts, expenses you cannot afford
3. Hiring a private attorney who is well-regarded in some
areas of practice yet has no practical experience with the
type of crime with which you are charged or in the
courthouse where you face trial
4. Hiring an attorney without knowing that he has a
horrible reputation among his peers.
The first two errors require generalized information to correct. The
second two errors require specific information about the individual
13. See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias, What If George Zimmerman Had A Public
Defender?, SLATE (July 15, 2013, 8:09 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/
2013/07/15/zimmerman_what_if_that_matters_what_if_he_d_been_poor.html
(last visited Apr. 22, 2018) (imagining that a public defender would have been
unable to mount a successful defense for George Zimmerman, and, instead, would
have provided ineffective legal advice) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
14. See Primus, supra note 11, at 1783–87 (discussing the inadequacy of
various public defender funding schemes).
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attorney considered for retention. All four are areas of information
that are, for the most part, ill-suited to inclusion in the prospectusstyle disclosure that Professor Edwards suggests.
The first two errors could be corrected by providing general
information about the quality of the public defender office, rather
than through specific information about each individual attorney
practicing in the jurisdiction. How can the public learn the relative
value of the local public defender office? The widespread belief that
any paid attorney is better than a public defender is based on a
stereotypical view that lawyers become public defenders only when
they have failed in private practice. When I was a public defender,
a frequent compliment I received from clients was, “you are good
enough to be a paid lawyer!”15 (I simply said, “thank you.”)
Before mortgaging a home or borrowing money from relatives,
defendants should know the quality of the public defense in their
jurisdiction and that private attorneys may only be able to afford
to charge low fees by carrying a high caseload, resolving cases
quickly, and minimizing spending on investigators and experts. In
contrast, the indigent defendant is entitled to public funds for
necessary investigation and expert opinions.16 Potential clients
should also know whether people represented by private attorneys
serve shorter sentences than people represented by public
defenders in their county or state.17
This information deficit is surmountable, in part because it is
easier to assess the quality of public defender offices than private
attorneys. As Professor Edwards notes, it is easier for a potential
client to learn the reputation of a large law firm than to grasp the
differences in reputation and quality among many solo
15. Clients also perceive that public defenders have a conflict of interest
because they are paid by the same government that is prosecuting the case. This
is a real concern in some jurisdictions where public defender independence is
compromised by pressure from the court or the public to expedite cases and
operate on reduced budgets. See generally Primus, supra note 11, at 1789.
16. See generally Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 60 (1985) (finding that an
indigent defendant is entitled to funds for expert necessary to ensure Sixth
Amendment right to defense).
17. One study concluded that defendants with paid attorneys receive shorter
sentences, but study results will likely vary depending on both the quality of the
local bar and the quality of the public defender’s office. See generally Morris B.
Hoffman et al., An Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness: SelfSelection by The Marginally Indigent, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 241, 242 (2005).
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practitioners or small firms.18 Moreover, fifteen states now have
Indigent Defense Commissions charged with reviewing the quality
of public defense.19 The model could be replicated in other states,
and the findings of the commissions’ studies could be made
available to defendants in the courthouse and the jail.
Turning to the second two information errors, which relate to
the quality of the individual attorney, it must first be noted that
the variability among the private defense bar is great. And, it is
not always apparent who is the best attorney for the case. Often
the best lawyer for a case is not the most prestigious lawyer in the
field, but the lawyer who has handled similar cases in the same
courtroom. Using the example of Mike Tyson’s rape trial, Professor
Paul Butler points out that an expensive attorney at a big firm who
has not tried rape cases may be less effective than a more
reasonably priced solo practitioner who has tried many rape cases
in the same courtroom.20 This example shows that even a
defendant with ample resources may be at a disadvantage when
trying to assess whether an attorney is experienced and competent
in a particular kind of case. Here, a prospectus that includes the
kinds of cases the defense attorney handled in the past and how
many cases went to jury trial could be helpful.
The final information problem is one that I witnessed in court
many times and always with distress. It is the local lawyer who is
experienced—perhaps brags of the hundreds of jury trials he has
handled—but whom everyone on the courthouse agrees is a
spectacularly ineffective lawyer. Although I am attracted to the
idea of a prospectus or pamphlet could alert defendants to this
attorney’s limited skills, a prospectus could not capture the kind of
information that would protect against this error The defense
attorney would disagree vigorously with his peers’ assessment of
his representation. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to turn
the legal community’s opinion of the attorney’s general courtroom
performance and negotiation skills into data points collected in a
prospectus.
18. Edwards, supra note 1, at 1484–85.
19. See generally Jennifer E. Laurin, Gideon By the Numbers: The
Emergence of Evidence-Based Practice is Indigent Defense, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
325, 337–38 (2015).
20. See generally BUTLER, supra note 10, at 212.
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B. Information Delivery Issues
The information that could be included in a prospectus would
not be sufficient to determine whether the attorney is good, only
whether the attorney is a charlatan. It seems almost too easy to
say that potential clients want to know and should know about an
attorney’s past suspensions from practice, censures by the state
bar, and judicial determinations of ineffectiveness. But this, like
licensure itself, seems to set the bar too low. A good lawyer is not
just a lawyer who has never faced public censure.
Moreover, some of the metrics of public censure are imprecise.
Disclosing all bar complaints, for example, may result in false
positives, that is, falsely determining that a lawyer is inadequate
because of a bar complaint. Former clients may file bar complaints
that lack merit.21 Likewise, ineffective assistance of counsel claims
may result in false negatives or positives. They may falsely suggest
no problems with the attorney because few reviewing courts find
defense counsel ineffective. The standard for winning an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is so onerous that even
meritorious claims are denied because the attorney error is deemed
unlikely to have changed the outcome of the trial.22 Attorneys may
sleep through portions of the trial and still be deemed “effective.”23
Conversely, counting the number of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims without regard to their resolution may result in
false positives because almost every post-conviction proceeding
involves at least one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
There is always something more the trial attorney could have done.
It would take an experienced criminal defense attorney to comb
through the cases to determine how each claim reflects the
attorney’s competence. This is more than a prospectus can do.

21. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 1499 (noting that this problem occurs in
criminal defense).
22. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
23. See Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that defendant
failed to demonstrate ineffectiveness of his defense counsel, who slept through
portions of the trial).
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Other quality metrics are perplexing as well. Requiring a
lawyer to provide a record of wins and losses is difficult in the
criminal context. Most criminal cases resolve through
plea-bargaining.24 This makes it impossible to calculate “win
rates.” It may also penalize attorneys who are willing and able to
go to trial. In the context of criminal defense, being willing to try a
“loser” can be an indication of good lawyering. It signals that the
attorney is willing to follow her client’s wishes to hold the
government to its burden of proof.25
Both the bar complaint and ineffectiveness claims and the
wins versus losses ratio metrics pose the threat of unintended
consequences. An attorney concerned that he must proactively
disclose all bar complaints may stop representing “difficult”
clients, including clients with mental health issues who are at high
risk of incarceration for behavior that is better addressed through
mental health treatment.26 If an attorney knows that her ratio of
wins to losses at trial must be provided up front to any client, she
may strenuously press her clients to take plea deals to avoid a loss.
Other forms of information about quality of representation,
like time spent with clients, researching, conducting investigation,
and overall hours per case, present problems of capture. This
information is typically gleaned in the interview process.27 As
Professor Edwards points out, potential clients are unlikely to seek
out the relevant information. Few defendants will properly
question their potential counsel and, if they do, the answers may
be incomplete and falsely reassuring.
24. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (noting that between
94% and 97% of criminal cases resolve in guilty pleas).
25. There are no “frivolous” assertions of the presumption of innocence in
criminal cases.
26. Approximately 64% of jail inmates suffer from mental illness. KIDEUK
KIM ET AL., URBAN INST., THE PROCESSING AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL
PERSONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A SCAN OF PRACTICE AND BACKGROUND
ANALYSIS (2015), www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/48981/2000173The-Processing-and-Treatment-of-Mentally-Ill-Persons-in-the-Criminal-JusticeSystem.pdf.
27. BUTLER, supra note 10, at 213–14. Professor Butler advises defendants
to interview their potential attorney about their experience with similar cases, as
well as the attorney’s speed and thoroughness in returning calls and keeping
clients apprised of developments in their case. Professor Butler also suggests that
defendants should ask the lawyer for three references of former clients and call
them. Id. at 214.
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Attorneys could report this information in a prospectus, but
how will it be confirmed? An interesting idea would be to audit the
data presented on the prospectus by random checks. The state bar
could do this using data-scraping software attached, temporarily,
to the attorney’s case-management software to trap data on hours,
motions filed, and sentence imposed after negotiated plea. Of
course, data collection from case management software raises
issues of confidentiality and inadvertent waivers of attorney-client
privilege that would have to be addressed before implementation.
In summary, even in cases in which the defendant can hire a
criminal defense attorney, it is very difficult to think of how to give
the potential client the information needed to make an informed
choice. While a prospectus could provide some information about
the quality of past representation, it poses problems both in terms
of content and feasibility. Most importantly, a prospectus fails to
address the most significant issue for most defendants in criminal
cases, which is the problem of poverty. Most defendants have their
freedom to choose curtailed by poverty, not by a deficit of
information.
III. Big Law, Public Defender-Style
The best way to ensure competent and zealous representation
is through state-wide public defender offices—big law, public
defender style. Studies demonstrate that public defenders are
more effective than panel attorneys, and state-wide public
defenders are more effective than county-based public defender
offices.28 In the world of public defense, bigger is better.
State-wide public defender offices can pool resources, both
financial and intellectual, and institutionalize a culture of zealous
advocacy.
A. Pooling Resources
28. James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does A
Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes (RAND
Corporation
working
paper,
WR-870-NIJ,
2011)
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2011/RAND_WR8
70.pdf.

432

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 420 (2018)

The size and structure of public defender offices make them
better able to marshal both the resources and the culture of
excellence necessary to ensure that the defendants receive zealous
representation. Even chronically underfunded public defenders
have the means of sharing resources that rely on human capital
and wisdom. Senior attorneys can mentor new attorneys; briefs
and motions can be stored and shared. Many offices have a staff
attorney with special training and experience in forensic science,
as well as social workers to write sentencing recommendations and
release plans.
Compare the ability to pool resources in a public defender
office to the common situation faced by panel attorneys who may
receive a flat fee per case or a low hourly rate that is capped at less
than $1000. The limited fee encourages the panel attorney to
accept the maximum number of cases, and to do the minimum
amount of work on them.29 This is not greed; it is keeping the office
lights on. Many panel attorneys cannot sustain a practice without
taking on hundreds of cases at a time. Panel attorneys may be
excellent, and, when they are, it is because they believe in and take
pride in the work they are doing, not because they are adequately
compensated. It is no surprise, then that, on average, public
defender offices outperform panel attorneys, at least according to
one analysis of the federal system.30
Whether panel attorney practice could be improved through
market-based incentives is currently being tested.31 Defendants
who are unable to afford an attorney may choose from a list of
panel attorneys. It remains to be seen whether competition for
court appointment will raise the standard of practice or whether,
instead, the chronic underfunding of the entire panel system will
keep the level of practice sub-optimal. Market-based solutions
have some appeal but are often inappropriate in contexts where
uniform performance is desirable and limited public funds make
29. See James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the
Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE
L.J. 154, 196 (2012) (calculating that a zealous and thorough defense attorney
would make approximately $2 per hour under the flat-rate fee in Philadelphia).
30. Radha Iyengar, An Analysis of the Performance of Federal Indigent
Defense Counsel 28 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13187,
2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/w13187.
31. Schulhofer, supra note 12.
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the pooling of resources more efficient than hoarding of resources
by individual attorneys seeking to beat their competitors. If
nothing else, competition among panel attorneys raises the
concerns posed by information asymmetries. Defendants pick
panel attorneys from a list but have limited information about
attorney performance. As discussed above, it is exceedingly
difficult to provide the relevant information in a prospectus or
otherwise.
It is important to note that pooling resources is not a panacea
for chronic, pervasive underfunding. The New Orleans Public
Defender Office, for example, reported that its attorneys have such
a high volume of cases that, given their limited size, each attorney
can spend just seven minutes on each case.32 As a midsized, county
public defender office, the New Orleans Public Defender is still in
a better position to advocate for more funding than panel attorneys
or small public defender offices. In recent years, some public
defender offices have used their power to gather data supporting
increased funding and decreased caseloads. Public defender offices
can commission workload studies, which can then be used in
legislative advocacy and litigation designed to ensure defenders
have manageable workloads.33 The chief public defender can use
the workload studies to argue for legislative change, or as part of
a system-wide litigation effort to reduce caseloads through
increased public defender funding.34 Although far from easy, the
task of leveraging data to advocate for increased funding is more
likely succeed when advanced by a large institutional actor like a
state-wide public defender.

32. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE:
THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 21–22 (2009).

33. Geoffrey T. Burkhart, How to Leverage Public Defense
Workload Studies, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 403, 420–422 (2017)
(describing new methods of workload assessment developed through
the Missouri Project workload study).
34. See, e.g. Della Hasselle, New Orleans Public Defenders to
Judge: Stop Assigning Us New Cases, AL JAZEERA AM. (Nov. 24, 2015),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/11/24/neworleans-publicdefenders-to-judge-stop-assigning-us-new-cases.html (last visited
May 4, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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B. Fostering Cultures of Excellence

The big-firm size of public defender offices results in the
gravitational pull of organizational culture.35 The culture can be
toward zealous advocacy, but that is certainly not always the case.
Even if they joined the public defender’s office eager to defend the
rights of the accused and protect the Constitution, “cynicism and
disillusionment” can set in and, ultimately, can become part of the
culture of the office.36 As Professor Primus puts it, the pressures of
the criminal justice system can take attorneys intending to be
zealous advocates and “beat the fight out of them.”37
The pull of organizational culture can be an asset as well.
Large public defender offices have extraordinary potential to
create an environment in which attorneys receive support,
encouragement, and motivation to continue to fight zealously for
clients who are reviled by the rest of the courtroom professionals.
They can standardize and institutionalize training that teaches
practical litigation skills as well as the public defender values of
zealous advocacy and collaboration among attorneys within the
office. The nonprofit, Gideon’s Army, an initiative of MacArthur
Genius Award recipient Jonathon Rapping, has rallied public
defender offices and supported the training of law students eager
to provide equal justice through public defense. As the culture of
the office shifts, attorneys who do not demonstrate this may be
pushed out by cultural norms or fired. The reputation of the agency
is enhanced, resulting in more applications from qualified
attorneys interested in joining the office. As a result of personnel
changes, uniform training, and attitudinal shifts in the
organization, a public defender office can ensure quality criminal
defense services with relatively low variability in quality among
its staff attorneys.

35. See generally Jonathan A. Rapping, Directing the Winds of Change:
Using Organizational Culture to Reform Indigent Defense, 9 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L.
177 (2008).
36. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st
Century, 58 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 85 (1995).
37. Primus, supra note 11.
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C. Reframing the Need for Information
The question of adequate information about attorney
performance is relevant but should be reframed. It is not a question
of how individual clients can evaluate individual attorneys, but of
how the public sphere can use the information available to
institutionalize excellence in public defense. First, policymakers
and lawmakers who create and fund public defender entities need
information about what works and how best to fund it. In this
regard, great headway has been made in the last fifteen years
through the indigent defense commissions described above and
other state efforts. Public defender performance can be measured
against benchmarks such as the American Bar Association’s Ten
Principles of a Public Defender Delivery System, which describes
the principles that a public defender agency “should embody in
order to deliver effective and efficient, high quality, ethical,
conflict-free representation to accused persons who cannot afford
to hire an attorney.”38
Second, public defender agencies need to use all available
internal resources, as well as external consultants, to get feedback
on the quality of representation they provide. The public defender
agency has the best access to information about its attorneys. It
can court watch, review case files, and even interview former
clients. Rather than expecting members of the public to discover
the good and bad attorneys, the public defender can simply fire the
bad ones. Moreover, it can address structural problems within the
agency that impede quality representation.
Third, defendants and their families should be provided with
a rating of their local public defender agency. Perhaps this is where
a prospectus would be helpful—not to provide information about
individual lawyers, but to provide a rating of the public defender
agency as an institution. While most public defender clients are
not free to choose their lawyer, providing clients with an honest
38. AM. BAR ASS’N, 10 PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENDER DELIVERY SYSTEM
(2002), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ aba/administrative/legal_
aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf;
see also ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense System, NAT’L LEGAL AID &
DEFENDER
ASS’N
(2010),
http://www.nlada.net/library/article/
na_abatenprinciples (last visited Dec. 13, 2017) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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appraisal of the quality of representation offered by the public
defender will go a long way toward dispelling myths about public
defenders and helping clients decide whether to call on outside
resources to hire a private attorney. It may also encourage the
general public to pressure their lawmakers to increase funding for
public defense.
IV. Conclusion
While the phrase, “knowledge is power,” is often true, it is a
complex truth when it comes to selecting an attorney. It is difficult
to get the necessary information, most of which could not be
summarized in a prospectus. More importantly, most defendants,
even when equipped with accurate information, lack the funds to
hire the attorney of their choice. Thus, although many defendants
who are unable to hire an attorney acutely feel the predicament of
their lack of choice, the root problem is one of resources, not deficits
in information and choice. This may be true in Professor Edwards’
example of the immigration context as well. Only 37% of
noncitizens in removal proceedings and 14% of noncitizens in
detention in removal proceedings hire counsel.39 Many
immigration clients do not have the ability to retain counsel of
their choice, and may be priced out of retaining successful
attorneys who charge higher rates.
There is still something to be said for the public sphere. As we
watch school systems dismantled in favor of decentralized,
competing schools and reimbursement schemes for private
education, it is worthwhile to remember that institutions bring
stability, identifiable culture, and pooled resources that can
prevent waste through duplication. Big law, public defender-style
works. We have examples that could be replicated throughout the
country to increase access to equal justice. Big law, public defender
tyle, could work for immigration too. The idea has been widely
discussed and may gain public support, even in the absence of a

39. INGRID EAGLY & STEVEN SHAFER, ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION
COURT
2
(2016),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites
/default/files/research/access_to_counsel_in_immigration_court.pdf.
Detention
results from, inter alia, financial inability to pay a bond. Id. at 31.
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constitutional mandate.40 Immigration defender offices could be
set up as a matter of policy, and, in some places, they have.41
As a final note, it is important to remember that better
attorneys are only part of the solution. Bad outcomes in court are
often the product of harsh laws more than poor representation.42 If
defendants face lengthy mandatory minimum sentences, they are
virtually forced to plead guilty to any offer the prosecutor makes,
regardless of the quality of their defense attorneys. The real
solutions lie with the prosecutors, who are beginning to exercise
their discretion to be “smart on crime,” rather than simply “tough
on crime,”43 and lawmakers who could decriminalize nonviolent
misdemeanors and reduce maximum punishments so that
defendants can exercise their right to trial without fear of
quadrupling their exposure to prison time.44 Good lawyers matter,
but fair laws matter too.

40. See generally, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L.J.
2282 (2013) (discussing issues related to establishing public immigration
defense).
41. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to
Immigration Court, 164 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2015) (noting advocacy for
immigration public defense from judges, lawyers, and policy makers).
42. See generally, e.g., Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the
Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176 (2013).
43. Maura Ewing, Philadelphia’s Top New Prosecutor Is Rolling Out Wild,
Unprecedented Criminal Justice Reforms, SLATE (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/03/phillys-new-top-prosecutor-is-rollingout-wild-unprecedented-criminal-justice-reforms.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2018)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
44. Misdemeanor statistics are staggering. They account for 80% of state
court dockets. It is difficult to overstate how dramatically they affect both
defendants and lawyers for the poor. See generally, e.g., Brian Altman, Improving
the Indigent Defense Crisis Through Decriminalization, 70 ARK. L. REV. 769
(2017); Alexandra Nataposs, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV.
1055, 1063 (2015).

